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Ethical Aspects of Behavior Steering Technology 
 
 
For a short period of time in the mid-1970s, a federal law in the United States mandated cars to be 
designed not to start if seat-belts were not worn.  Cars produced during that brief period of history had 
an electric link between the seats, seat belts and starter.  In the seats, there were weight-sensing 
elements that registered whether a person was using the seat.  If so, the seat belt for that seat would 
have to be fastened or the starter would not work (and a buzzer would sound).  This mechanism is an 
example of behavior-steering technology, which is a technology in which one of its main functions is 
to make users of the technology behave in a way that is not necessarily desired by the user but that is 
desired by some other party in control of the technology.  Usually, such behavior-steering functions are 
designed to be part of the technology by order of a government or other standard-setting body or by an 
organization that has commissioned the technology.  Some other examples of behavior-steering 
technologies (BSTs) are gas pedals that increase their resistance the foot of the driver when the car is 
going above a certain speed limit so as to encourage a more ecomical use of energy, or the heavy 
weights on hotel keys that induces hotel guests to drop off the key at the receptionist before going 
outside. 
 The question that is to be discussed in this essay is under what circumstances, if any, the use 
of behavior-steering technology is justified from a moral point of view, and under what circumstances 
its use may become morally problematic.  The U.S. seatbelt case illustrates that behavior-steering 
technologies are sometimes controversial.  U.S. car drivers did not appreciate being mechanically 
forced to wear their seat belts, and many drivers had the mechanism illegally removed.  Some people 
even mounted a court challenge: they felt that the coercive mechanism in place went against their civil 
liberties.  As a result of these protests, the law was repealed, and wearing seat belts became again 
something that was mandatory but no longer mechanically forced. 
So when are behavior-steering functions morally permissible?  When is the moral price that 
has to be paid for the perceived benefits of behavior steering to be too high?  In what follows, I will 
discuss three moral issues need to be considered in the use of behavior-steering technologies (BSTs): 
the freedom issue, the technocracy versus democracy issue and the responsibility issue. 
 
1.  The freedom issue 
 
The seat belt example suggests that there may be circumstances in which the use of BSTs infringes on 
freedom rights.  Even if the seat belt mechanism at issue can be shown not to infringe on basic freedom 
rights, it is easy to think up examples of BSTs that do.  One could, for example, imagine a car with an 
on-board navigation system that puts certain areas of town off-limits whenever the city government 
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believes this to be a good idea. Or one could imagine automobiles in fundamentalist countries that only 
start after an intelligent camera on board has determined the driver to be male, or to be wearing the 
right state-prescribed clothing. Or one could imagine a car with a mechanical arm inside that hits the 
driver when he is going over the legal speed limit or swerves on the road.   There are also examples of 
BSTs that clearly do not infringe on freedom rights.  The hotel key with the heavy ball, for example, 
can hardly be argued to be a sinister coercive instrument of hotel owners that wrongly restricts the 
freedom of hotel guests. 
 So under what circumstances do BSTs restrict human behavior to the extent that basic 
freedom rights are violated?  To answer this question, I will first briefly discuss the classical distinction 
between two conceptions of freedom, or liberty, that has been proposed by philosopher Isaiah Berlin in 
his famous essay “Two concepts of liberty”.  Berlin argues that, historically, the concept of liberty has 
has two quite different meanings.  In the first, ‘negative’ sense, a person is free to the extent to which 
his actions are not obstructed or interfered with by others.  Your amount of personal freedom, in this 
sense, is given by the area within which you can act unobstructed by others.  In the second, ‘positive’ 
sense, a person is free to the extent to which he his his own master, whose life and decisions depend 
upon himself and not upon external forces of any kind.  Such a person is autonomous, or self-
determining, and is able to think freely, bear responsibility for his own choices, and able to explain 
them by reference to his own ideas and purposes.  He is his own master, and a slave to no one. 
 To better understand this contrast, imagine a ruler or king who has unlimited freedom to do 
whatever he pleases - none of his subjects dare disobey him or get in his way.  Yet, all his actions turn 
out to be strongly conditioned by his father, to which he is psychologically dependent to a large extent: 
all his choices and actions in life are in fact mere attempts to please his father rather than reasoned, 
autonomous choices of a free agent.  Such a ruler, then, enjoys a large amount of ‘negative’ freedom 
but little or no ‘positive’ freedom.  In contrast, a Nelson Mandela, when still locked in his cell during 
the apartheid regime in South Africa, had very little ‘negative’ freedom, but his independent, unbroken 
spirit conferred to him a great amount of ‘positive’ freedom. 
 
‘negative’ freedom or freedom from interference 
 
This distinction suggests that BSTs may restrict freedom in two ways: by restricting negative liberty 
and by restricting positive liberty.  Let us first turn to restrictions of negative liberty.  These occur 
when BSTs interfere with the activity of technology users.  But, as the hotel key example shows, not 
every such interference constitutes an infringement on human rights.  So when does interferences by 
BSTs go too far? A first possible line of response to this question would be to argue that interference 
goes too far when the majority of technology users believes that the BST interferes with their actions to 
an unreasonable extent, as happened with the seat belt mechanism.  Yet, this response is not wholly 
satisfactory: that a majority believes that a particular technology is unacceptable does not necessarily 
mean that it is, in fact, unacceptable. 
 Usually, BSTs are used to promote some socially desirable end, such as sustainability, safety, 
efficiency, or equity.  The price that is sometimes paid for these ends is that limits are imposed on the 
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scope of individual behavior, thus constaining individual liberties.  In trading off these positive and 
negative impacts of BSTs, the importance of promoting positive ends must be weighed against the cost 
to individual liberty.  A BST may then turn out to be justified, even if there is resistance to it.  This is 
the case when, the cost of not using the BST can be shown to be greater than the cost to individual 
liberty when it is used.  For instance, a careful assessment may show that meeting environmental goals 
requires more efficient use of the automobile, and that this requirement can only be met through certain 
coercive measures such as speed delimiters built into automobiles because less coercive alternatives 
have failed.  When it is determined in the democratic political arena that sustainability is a greater good 
than the right of drivers to drive at high speeds, then such coercive methods may turn out to be 
justified.  At the same time, there may be some basic freedom rights that arguably should not be 
violated under any circumstances: rights such as included in the declaration of human rights, such as 
the right to freedom of movement, freedom of speech and freedom of assembly.  These are ones that 
are essential to realizing one’s individual life plans. 
 
‘positive’ freedom or autonomy 
 
Let us now turn to ‘positive’ freedom or autonomy.  Autonomy is not threatened by a few BSTs that 
restrict freedom of movement.  Autonomy becomes threatened when essential parts of our lives are 
conditioned by BSTs, to such an extent that they do not merely interfere with our actions, but go as far 
as to shape and condition our plans and goals.  Suppose, for example, that automobiles do not just 
require us to wear a seat belt, but in fact do the driving for us: they are programmed to select routes for 
us, select driving speeds, stop at stop signs, regulate the internal temperature, and so on.  Driving in 
such ‘intelligent’ automobiles is not an autonomous activity, but is governed by the dictates of the 
automobile; the human driver merely follows its choices. 
Suppose, now, that other machines like our personal computer, toaster, laundry machine, 
refrigerator and personal digital assistant are programmed similarly to make our choices for us - which 
they increasingly are.  Living in such a technological culture, in which machines decide for us, we are 
no longer autonomous decision-makers, but leave it to machines to tell us what is good for us and what 
we should therefore do.  The programmed choices of these machines may sometimes coincide with 
choices that we would have made ourselves, but at other times may reflect interests of a government or 
of a company one works for, or may simply be wrong guesses about our own preferences.   
A transfer of intelligent thought and decision-making from persons to machines is not 
necessarily a bad thing; there are many things that we would rather have machines decide on: how hard 
to suck in air when vacuuming different surfaces, or when to inflate an air bag in an automobile.  It is 
only when machines try to determine more overarching goals of activities that autonomy is 
significantly eroded: when an automobile tells us where we want to go or how fast we want to go there, 
or when word processing software changes spelling, grammar and style of our writings without giving 
us the opportunity to overrule its choices. 
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2.  The technocracy versus democracy issue 
 
BSTs have been accused of of being a technocratic method for shaping society and implementing 
policy.  A technocracy is a society in which political power rests to a significant extent in the hands of 
scientists, engineers and other experts, who use scientific principles and technological means to attain 
political ends.  A technocratic solution to a policy problem is, therefore, a solution in which technical 
solutions to problems have taken the place of political decisions.  This is customarily held to be 
desirable for at least two reasons: because technocratic solutions are not democratic, and because they 
depend on the false idea that social problems can be solved by means of a technological ‘fix’. 
 The first of these criticisms, that technocratic solutions are not democratic, has been held by 
critics of technocracy such as Jürgen Habermas, Helmut Schelsky, Jacques Ellul and Max Horkheimer.  
They have argued that science and technology have an internal logic or rationality of their own, that 
presents itself in an objective form that cannot easily be criticized in a democratic political arena.  If 
scientists and engineers have determined that  solving world hunger requires the genetic engineering of 
crops and that solving traffic jams requires satellite monitoring of traffic, how can politicians dispute 
these ideas if they lack the proper expertise?  Scientific-technological decision-making and 
(democratic) political decision-making hence seem to belong to separate spheres; yet, in a technocracy 
the first increasingly takes the place of the second, and hence politics becomes less democratic. 
The image of science and technology on which this criticism rests has since been shown to be 
problematic, however.  In contemporary science and technology studies (e.g., Mackenzie and 
Wajcman, 199; Bijker, Pinch and Hughes, 1987), it is held that science and technology are socially 
shaped: they are not the result of objective, rational principles but are contingent outcomes of 
confrontations between humans and nature that involve value- and interest laden choices.  Therefore, 
there is no principled dichotomy between science and technology on the one hand, and politics on the 
other.  This is most obviously so for technology: technological artifacts and systems can be developed 
to reflect the narrow interests of designers or corporations, but can also be developed in a more 
democratic manner, to reflect the values and interests of a wide range of people (e.g., Sclove. 1995).  
Therefore, technological solutions to social problems are not necessarily less democratic than social 
solutions such as laws and protocols.   
Nevertheless, there is a danger that BSTs become undemocratic technologies, because their 
basic functionality may still be largely decided by engineers rather than by democratic representatives.  
A democratic design of a BST requires that a procedure is followed that is similar to the development 
of a new law: a careful consideration of alternatives, and a democratic procedure in which parties with 
different interests can let their voices be heard.  The functional properties of the BST, if not the precise 
underlying mechanism, must be sufficiently clear to non-experts; this requires an effort of both the 
experts and laypersons to find a common vocabulary to discuss the political consequences of the 
technical choices that can be made. 
 The idea that social problems can be solved by means of a technological ‘fix’ is perhaps more 
problematic in this context.  The seat belt case shows that engineers and policy makes are often 
overoptimistic about the usefulness of technologies in solving social problems. As pointed out by 
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Norman (1988), the American seat belt mechanism that required car drivers and passengers to wear 
seat belt had many problems.  For example, the mechanism could not distinguish legitimate case in 
which the seatbelt should not be buckled from illegitimate ones.  If you wanted to carry a heavy 
package, for example, you were forced to buckle it.  And the mechanisms were not reliable, so they 
often failed, wrongly buzzing, and stopping the engine.  Moreover, the mechanism was easy to 
circumvent by simply buckling the belts and suffing them under the seat.  This example shows that 
BSTs require careful assessment to make sure they are reliable, work right, and distinguish legitimate 
violations from illegitimateones.  This is very hard to attain for any technological solution to a social 
problem. 
 
 
3.  The responsibility issue 
 
The final moral issue relating to BSTs is that they may create a responsibility vacuum: a situation in 
which it is fundamentally uncrear who is responsible for actions and their consequences.  Many BSTs 
take away some amount of responsibility from their users.  For example, there are automobile that take 
over the brakes when a car goes into a skid.  But this means that in a resulting fatal accident, not just 
the behavior of the driver can be blamed, but also the behavior of the car itself, and the company who 
programmed the brakes to respond in a certain manner.  In society, individuals are expected to take 
moral responsibility  for their actions, which means that they can be held accountable for them, and can 
receive praise or blame for them.  The use of BSTs complicates the assignment of responsibility, 
because users may claim responsibility did not rest with them.   
 
4.  Conclusion: dealing with the moral issues in behavior-steering technology 
 
When developing a BST, three moral issues must be considered: (1) what are its negative consequences 
for the individual freedoms of users and can such consequences be morally defended?  (2) is there 
sufficient democratic input during the process of design and implementation of the technology? and (3) 
what implications does the BST have for the distribution of responsibility between the user on the one 
hand and the technology and its developers on the other? 
Regarding the first issue, I have suggested that BSTs should refrain from violating basic 
freedom rights but may constrain human action if there is a greater good that is served by this, and I 
have suggested that  BSTs should not erode autonomy by taking away decision-making power over the 
basic ways in which individuals live their lives.  Regarding the second issue, I have argued that BSTs 
can be designed in more democratic and more technocratic ways, and that for BSTs that are intended to 
provide policy solutions, an effort should be made for the development process to be as transparent and 
democratic as possible; also, I have argued that it is desirable to anticipate on side-effects of the use of 
BSTs in real settings, so as to avoid BSTs from being poorly-thought-out ‘technological fixes’.   
Regarding the final issue, the responsibility issue, it is desirable that the question of how responsibility 
is distributed in the use of a BST is answered before a BST is put into use: involved actors (notably, the 
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manufacturer and the user) should be clear on who is responsible when the use of the BST results in 
harmful consequences. 
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